



code intelligence

Introduction to modern fuzzing

Find and fix vulnerabilities before they reach production



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Senior Software Developer

Background

- Master Computer Science
- Backend- / Web-Development
- Focus on Software Quality

Responsibilities at Code Intelligence

- CLI Tools



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[jochil](#)


1. What is Fuzzing

- a. History
- b. Classification

2. Modern Fuzzing

- a. Where to use it
- b. What kind of bugs / vulnerabilities can it find

3. Live Demos



Finding Heartbleed

This tutorial will show you how to find [Heartbleed](#) using libFuzzer and ClusterFuzz.



ShellShock / Bashdoor

50 CVEs in 50 Days: Fuzzing Adobe Reader

December 12, 2018


Research By: Yoav Alon, Netanel Ben-Simon

fuzz | verb.

/'fəz/

1. to make or become blurred

Random Inputs



System
under Test



- Random Testing is around since the 1950s
- Fuzz Testing (Fuzzing) originated around 1988
 - <https://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~bart/fuzz/> (project still active)
- 2012 Google announces ClusterFuzz
- 2013 first release of American fuzzy lop (AFL)
 - 2014 Shellshock most vulnerabilities discovered by AFL
- 2016 libFuzzer part of LLVM/clang
- 2016 Google announces OSS-Fuzz
- 2020 Microsoft releases OneFuzz

... by Target

- Application fuzzing
- Protocol fuzzing
- File format fuzzing

... by knowledge of program structure (*-box)

- white
- grey
- black

... by how input is generated


- Generation-based fuzzing
Generating input based on a model or grammar (eg. source code, file formats, ...)
- Mutation-based fuzzing
Mutating input (bit flipping, ...)

... by input structure awareness

- Smart fuzzing
- Dump fuzzing


(Coverage) Guided mutation-based fuzzing

- Generating new input from existing one (bit flipping, evolutionary /genetic algorithms, ...)
- Evaluate Inputs based on watched behavior




Black-box Fuzzing

- No knowledge of which code is reached
- Misses critical bugs




Coverage-guided Fuzzing

- Intelligent & feedback-driven mutations
- Maximizes code coverage



In-process fuzzing



- Fuzzer runs in the process (or VM) of the SUT
- Fast
- Relatively easy to get information


Out-of-process fuzzing

- Fuzzer runs alongside the SUT
- Usually a little bit more “communication” overhead
- Useful for distributed systems, if used with “talk back” channel
 - Microservices
- Often used for protocol fuzzing

Components of a Fuzzing System




code intelligence



Needed for actual triggering the Bug / Vulnerability

Common (C/C++) Sanitizer:

- AddressSanitizer (ASan)
- MemorySanitizer (MSan)
- UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer (UBSan)
- ThreadSanitizer (TSan)



- ASan
 - (Global|Heap|Stack) Buffer Overflow
 - Use after (return|free|scope)
 - Memory Leaks
 - ...
- MSan: reads of uninitialized memory
- TSan: Data Races, Deadlocks
- UBSan
 - Signed integer overflow
 - Out of bounds (Array/BitShifts)
 - Floating point conversion overflow
 - Dereferencing misaligned or null pointers
 - ...
- Resource usage bugs: Memory exhaustion, hangs or infinite loops, infinite recursion
- Logical bugs:
 - Discrepancies between two implementations of the same protocol
 - Round-trip consistency bugs (e.g. compress the input, decompress back, - compare with the original)
 - ...
- Plain Crashes: NULL dereferences, Uncaught exceptions

Anything that consumes untrusted or complicated inputs!


- Parsers
- Media codecs
- Network protocols, RPC libraries
- Crypto
- Compression
- Compilers and interpreters
- Regular expression matchers
- Text/UTF processing
- Databases
- Browsers
- Text editors/processors
- OS Kernels, drivers, supervisors and VMs

- Non-crashing bugs are hard to find
- Fuzzing without Sources makes everything harder
 - Coverage Informations
 - Input formats
 - “Brandon Falk - Adventures in Fuzzing” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SngK4W4tVc0>

Demo Time



- Coverage-guided: based on libFuzzer & JaCoCo
- In-process: very fast (up to 1M executions/s)
- Open source since Feb 2021
- Powers JVM Fuzzing in Google's OSS-Fuzz
- Autofuzz mode
- Hooks for own Sanitizer/Bug detectors



Functional Bugs

- Uncaught exceptions
- Assertions
- Inconsistent implementations (differential fuzzing)
- Property-based testing

Security Issues

- Infinite loops
- OutOfMemoryError
- Remote Code Execution
- Path Traversal
- Injections into Domain Specific Languages (SQL, EL, Scripts, ...)
- ...

Demo Jazzer



 github.com/CodeIntelligenceTesting/jazzer



- Goals

- Writing Fuzz tests should be as easy as writing unit tests
- One convenient CLI tool, no matter if you are working with C++ or JavaScript

- Under active development

- Open source from the start

- Features by now

- C/C++ including very comfortable CMake integration
- IDE Integration (CLion, vscode)
- Coverage reporting
- Sandboxing (linux)
- Regression testing
- Findings management

- Soon

- Java / Jazzer Support
- JavaScript / Jazzer.js Support
- Out-of-the-box Debugging
- SaaS Connection



Demo cifuzz

 github.com/CodeIntelligenceTesting/cifuzz



- Coverage-guided, in-process fuzzer for node.js
- We will releasing it next week as open source



Ganz neu - Jazzer.js

 github.com/CodeIntelligenceTesting/jazzer.js



- Try to optimize coverage
 - give hints to the fuzzer (seed corpus, internal structures)
- It helps a lot if your fuzz test/target is... (same for the SUT ;))
 - deterministic (eg. not changing global state)
 - stable and fast
 - not wasting resources
- Use FuzzedDataProvider, especially for C/C++ :)

Some Sources

- <https://github.com/secfigo/Awesome-Fuzzing>
- <https://github.com/google/fuzzing>
- <https://www.code-intelligence.com/blog>

We are hiring ... of course ;)

- Senior Go Developer (d/f/m)
- Senior Fuzzing Expert (d/f/m)
- (Senior) Clojure Developer (d/f/m)
- Senior Backend Developer (d/f/m)
- Application Security Engineer / Pentester / DevSecOps (d/f/m)
- ... and a few more



<https://www.code-intelligence.com/careers>



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Thanks for joining me!
Any Questions?

